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“I saw the light”: Former Protestant
believer testimonials in the Soviet
Union, 1957-1987
« J’ai vu la lumière » : témoignages d’anciens protestants en Union soviétique,
1957-1987
Emily Baran
1 This  statement  by  a  former  Baptist,  published  in  a  volume  of  stories  from  former
believers in 1958, reflects a major shift in religious policy in the Soviet Union that began
after the death of Josef Stalin in 1953. Under Nikita Khrushchev (1953-1964), the Soviet
state  launched a  new effort  to  combat  religious  belief  without  recourse to  the mass
imprisonment and exile employed by the Stalinist state. For Khrushchev, the continued
presence of  religious  belief  in  the Soviet  Union represented a  serious  barrier  to  the
achievement of communism. While socialism had allegedly eliminated the class basis for
religion in the Soviet Union, Khrushchev recognized that religion would not die out of its
own  accord,  but  would  require  the  active  intervention  of  the  state  to  destroy  this
“survival” (perezhitok) from the capitalist past. Making antireligious propaganda a major
feature  of  his  religious  policy,  he  promoted  the  idea  that  with  the  proper  atheist
education,  believers  could  be  convinced  to  reject  religious  beliefs  and  embrace
communist ideology instead.2
2 This strategy found reflection in the press, which became a critical organ for promoting
antireligious propaganda. Having denounced previous press coverage of religion as too
abstract,  theoretical,  and  disconnected  from  local  conditions,  the  state  exhorted
newspapers to explain to their readers the specific beliefs and practices of individual
religions and to tailor their coverage to reflect the distinct religious communities in their
respective districts and republics. In keeping with this practice, newspapers also reported
on the lives of religious believers in their communities, taking a two-pronged approach in
such  articles.  While  denouncing  the  nefarious  deeds  of  corrupt  clergy  and  religious
“I saw the light”: Former Protestant believer testimonials in the Soviet Unio...
Cahiers du monde russe, 52/1 | 2011
1
leaders, they depicted rank-and-file members as victims of religion who must patiently
and non-judgmentally be encouraged to renounce their faith and rejoin Soviet society.
3 To accomplish the latter task, the press provided living proof of these allegedly loyal, but
gullible  Soviet  believers  who  had  been  led  astray  by  a  few  fanatics  and  leaders.3
Newspaper-scripted testimonials from former believers thus became a defining feature of
the post-Stalin press’s treatment of religion. District and regional newspapers published
thousands of articles by former believers renouncing their faith and encouraging others
to follow their example. They share a common narrative structure: Personal hardship and
ignorance make citizens vulnerable to proposed religious solutions to their problems.
They join a “sect” hoping to find acceptance and answers to their problems.4 Having
joined, they gradually come to realize the organization’s political aims, hypocrisy, and/or
criminal activities. The former believers’ growing doubt in the organization is coupled
with doubts about its religious doctrine, which ultimately leads to a decision to leave the
sect.  This separation allows the former believers to reintegrate into Soviet society as
“converted atheists.” They now can achieve happiness and a purpose in life through
building communism.
4 This article dissects former believer narratives from the Khrushchev era until the rise to
power of Mikhail Gorbachev (1985-1991). While state religious policy evolved significantly
throughout this time frame, former believer testimonials showed remarkable constancy
in  content  and  style.  In  particular,  the  article  explores  testimonials  from  former
Protestants,  a  broad  category  that  included  Baptists,  by  far  the  largest  Soviet
denomination, as well as Seventh-Day Adventists, Pentecostals, and Jehovah’s Witnesses,
the smallest of these communities.5 Despite the denominational differences, the narrative
plots of these stories are strikingly similar.6 While the press also published stories by
former Orthodox believers,  in  particular  former priests,  nuns,  and monks,  they vary
significantly from those written by Protestants and deserve a separate study. My sample
comprises hundreds of articles published in regional (oblast’) and republic newspapers in
the post-Stalin era through the mid-1980s. It also includes articles published in several
district (raion) newspapers in Soviet Moldavia, where a relatively high level of religious
belief  resulted  in  a  large  volume  of  such  narratives.7 Lastly,  I  draw  from  believer
narratives published in book-length collections and in the nationally-distributed atheist
magazines Nauka i religiia [Science and Religion] and Liudyna i svit [Man and the World].
 
Khrushchev’s New Religious Policy
5 In  the  late  Stalin  era,  religion  received  little  attention  in  the  Soviet  press,  despite
continued criminal prosecution of believers for state crimes and the wholesale exile of
Witnesses from the western borderlands in 1949 and 1951. The general resurgence in
newspaper coverage of religion began with Khrushchev’s Hundred Days campaign against
religion  in  1954.  Although  the  state  quickly  pulled  back  from  the  campaign,  citing
overzealous  local  officials,  Khrushchev  did  not  abandon  his  new  religious  policy,
relaunching it in the late 1950s with greater success.8 Khrushchev argued that while the
Soviet  state  had eliminated the  economic  wealth  and political  power  of  the  church,
religious  superstition lingered among the  population,  particularly  in  rural  areas  and
among older citizens. The wartime annexation of new territories, particularly western
Ukraine, had aggravated this problem by greatly increasing the number of churches and
active believers in the Soviet Union. To undo this postwar religious growth, Khrushchev
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ordered the closing of over five thousand churches, a move that primarily affected the
Russian  Orthodox  Church.9 At  the  same  time,  Khrushchev  argued  that  in  order  to
eliminate religious belief entirely, the Party needed to make a major investment of time
and resources  into “scientific”  atheist  propaganda and agitation.  In  particular,  Party
activists must explain to believers the falsity of religion and the superiority of communist
ideology without offending them and with minimal recourse to coercive measures against
ordinary believers.10 To realize this goal, the Party-state sharply increased funding for
antireligious  propaganda  and  the  study  of  scientific  atheism.11 It  did  not,  however,
abandon the use of criminal prosecution against believers, a practice that continued into
the Gorbachev era.
6 The state  also  expanded state  registration  for  Protestant  religious  communities  that
conformed to Soviet laws, granting organizations the right to hold services in officially
designated houses of worship, while also increasing control over these religious bodies.
Registration  was  not  extended  to  all  Protestant  organizations.  The  state  considered
Witnesses, Adventist-Reformists, and many Pentecostals to be “anti-state and fanatical in
character” and barred them from registration. Baptist congregations, though granted this
right, were divided over the issue of registration, which some refused due to the risk of
being  coopted  by  the  state.12 As  a  whole,  registration  rewarded  those  religious
organizations  that  agreed to  cooperate  with  the  state  and not  challenge  the  official
ideology, while marginalizing those who did not abide by these strictures.
7 The Soviet state used registration to justify its continued use of coercive measures against
some believers. In its view, registration offered all legitimate religions the opportunity to
practice their faith in accordance with Soviet laws. Those religious believers who did not
register their congregations or whose actions violated the registration guidelines were
criminals and deserved to be punished to the full extent of the law. In accordance with
this interpretation, the state began stricter enforcement of the existing religious laws.13
Through the late 1950s, the state continued to use the Stalin-era approach of prosecuting
believers under state crime statutes (Article 58), but in 1960, it modified the criminal
code, introducing article 227, which mandated five-year prison terms or exile for persons
engaging in religious activities  that  endangered public  health,  incited citizens not  to
fulfill their civic duties, or enticed minors.14 Under article 227, members of unregistered
religious organizations, particularly, but not exclusively, those in leadership positions,
faced the constant threat of arrest and imprisonment.
8 The state promoted the view that  those believers  tried for  illegal  religious activities
represented a tiny fraction of Soviet believers, most of whom were loyal to the state and
abided by its laws. According to Khrushchev, the vast majority of believers had to be
convinced  to  renounce  their  faith  solely  through  patient  and  scientific  atheist
propaganda and agitation. Only a small minority of fanatics and unregistered religious
leaders, who stubbornly refused to obey the law and whose actions endangered the state
and its citizens, must be removed from society through criminal prosecution.
9 The 1964 ouster of Khrushchev from his position as General Secretary brought Leonid
Brezhnev (1964-82) to power and ended certain elements of the antireligious campaigns.
William Fletcher identifies two key changes to religious policy as a result of Khrushchev’s
removal from the Party leadership: the end to massive church closures and the more
selective use of “force” against believers.15 Under Brezhnev, the state focused on gradual
improvements in atheist educational work and on increasing control over both registered
and unregistered religious organizations. The policy change mirrored the new priorities
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of the Brezhnev state, marked by an emphasis on foreign policy, domestic stability, and a
crackdown on dissidents. Yet the actual content of atheist work on the ground level often
varied little, if at all, from that of the Khrushchev era. As anthropologist Alexei Yurchak
notes about the late Soviet era, “The form of ideological representations — documents,
speeches, ritualized practices, slogans, posters, monuments, and urban visual propaganda
— became increasingly normalized, ubiquitous, and predictable.”16 Yurchak’s words offer
an apt description of former believer narratives during this period.
 
Drafting Former Believers
10 In the postwar Stalin years,  the state kept religion largely out of its newspapers and
devoted minimal energy to antireligious propaganda and agitation. The few articles that
did  appear  had  little  information  on  Soviet  religious  life,  and  certainly  no
acknowledgment  of  state  repression  of  Protestant  religious  communities.  The  new,
expansive  religious  reporting  of  the  late  1950s  marked a  major  departure  from this
strategy. The state hoped that increased social exposure of believers in their communities
would encourage (or pressure) believers to conform to secular society and abandon their
faith. Beginning with this second religious campaign and continuing until the late 1980s,
former believer testimonials appeared regularly in the Soviet press as often as once a
week in district newspapers.
11 The success of the new religious policy rested, in part, on the ability of the Soviet state to
gain the trust of believers and win their hearts and minds for communism. The state
repeatedly encouraged atheist agitators to commit to individual work with believers in
their locales, a practice that meant engaging with and debating religious believers on a
very direct level. This necessitated that agitators have detailed knowledge of the beliefs,
practices,  and  history  of  specific  religions,  a  problem  given  the  dearth  of  accurate
published  information  on  Protestantism  in  the  Soviet  Union.17 In  one  embarrassing
example, an atheist agitator spent an entire year convincing one believer to leave the
Baptist religion.  At the end of the year,  she told him, “You’ve convinced me. I  don’t
believe in Baptism.” A short while later,  the agitator learned that the woman in fact
belonged to the Witnesses.18 Thus the press also needed to serve as a source of accurate
information to improve the quality of antireligious propaganda and to teach agitators to
distinguish between the myriad of religious organizations in their communities. Former
believers  offered a  unique opportunity  to  bridge  this  information gap through their
ability to reveal insider knowledge on belief systems, rituals, and practices. The state also
hoped that believers might listen more readily to the words of former fellow members of
their  religion  than  they  would  to  an  atheist  agitator.  Ideally,  the  state  would  turn
believers into atheists, and then redeploy them into agitation work, a sector in perpetual
need of qualified cadres. Indeed, the press comprised only one outlet for former believers,
who frequently told their stories multiple times and in multiple venues. Party activists
invited these individuals to give talks to current believers.19 The state also used former
believers as star witnesses for the prosecution in criminal trials against religious leaders.
20 To increase the flow of former believers into agitation work,  the state encouraged
individuals  to  view public  denunciation of  religion as  a  necessary  rite  of  passage  in
converting from Protestantism to an atheist worldview.
12 Lastly, former believers provided proof of the effectiveness of the state’s religious policy.
Local officials often measured the success or failure of atheist agitation by the number of
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believers who had not only renounced religion, but had spoken publicly in the press.21
The number of former believers offered a more attractive yardstick for officials than the
actual  number  of  believers.  As  religion  stubbornly  refused  to  disappear  in  their
communities,  they could at  least  point  to  atheist  testimonials  as  evidence that  their
propaganda efforts were having some positive impact.  To encourage better results,  a
great deal of pressure could be placed on individual believers. A 1980 complaint from one
Witness hints at this reality. He states that his city soviet told him that in order to get an
apartment, he would need to denounce the Witnesses in the press.22 Another man had his
driver’s license taken until he agreed to renounce religion.23
13 Once believers had been convinced to renounce religion, reporters and atheist agitators
helped them to craft their stories into a framework that fit the goals of the new religious
policy. As a result, former believer stories have a striking similarity in style and rhetoric
that is not at all coincidental. Yurchak notes how Soviet newspapers commonly scripted
letters to the editor, for example, in order to promote a specific message by the editorial
board.24 Outside help in drafting these testimonials was further necessitated by the fact
that  some,  mostly  elderly,  rural  believers  had  little  education  and  a  few were  even
illiterate. The magazine Nauka i religiia, in a 1960 article detailing the steep rise in articles
by former believers across the USSR, noted that many stories come from people “not used
to holding a pen.”25 In such cases, newspapers sometimes printed the signature of the
person to denote his or her consent to the written version of the story that they had
conveyed orally to an interviewer, or simply retold the story on behalf of the believer.26
Overall, the average religious believer, as portrayed in the narratives, lived in a small
town or village, had not finished high school, and worked on a kolkhoz, in a factory, or
was engaged in other unskilled manual labor. The ages varied widely, and both genders
were well-represented.
14 Although the authorities manipulated these former believer testimonials, their authors
stressed that they had written the stories of their own free will, and not under pressure
from the state or for personal gain.27 While outside pressure certainly did exist in most
scenarios, these stories came from real individuals who had been involved in religion. In
some instances, the same people appeared in articles about religious believers prior to
renouncing  their  beliefs.  For  example,  a  1957  article  accused  a  woman  of  having
committed  adultery  with  another  believer  and  of  having  helped  kidnap  the  man’s
stepchild. But in 1969, papers printed a glowing review of her memoirs, published soon
after her break with religion.28 Also, since the majority of these articles were published in
local papers, the reader might know the individuals in question. As a result, the names,
dates,  and  broad  plot  of  the  narratives  likely  corresponded  to  real  life  events.
Nevertheless, former believers undoubtedly were coached as to what to say and how to
say it,  and embellished events to reflect better on themselves and to demonize their
former religion.
15 Former believer narratives reflect the wider importance of autobiographies and the self-
fashioning of identity after 1917. From private diaries to public petitions, Soviet citizens
honed the art of constructing a personal life story that identified themselves as worthy of
membership in the new Soviet society. As historian Jochen Hellbeck notes, a person’s
autobiography became “an artifact of considerable political weight.”29 Numerous scholars
have written about autobiographies and the larger process of self-transformation under
Stalin. Many of their insights regarding this earlier narrative construction hold true for
former believer testimonials in the post-Stalin era. Igal Halfin, for example, writes that
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“Communist life stories were always fabricated insofar as the author followed the official
script… The author always hoped to present himself in the best light possible, not just to
others, but to himself as well.”30 This was certainly the case for former believers, whose
stories follow a standard format and portray their authors in a sympathetic manner.
Miriam Dobson has extended this scholarship into the early Khrushchev era, examining
petitions for release and rehabilitation of prisoners and ex-prisoners to state officials.
Dobson writes that these individuals had to “persuade officials that they were fit to be
considered  Soviet  citizens  once  more  and  their  status  as  outcasts  was  erroneous.”31
Similarly, former believers wanted their fellow citizens and local authorities to see them
as  trustworthy  members  of  society,  despite  their  past  involvement  in  a  religious
organization. Overall, Protestant former believer testimonials are best seen as one aspect
of a broader tradition pervasive throughout Soviet society of constructing one’s identity
and personal life trajectory in line with the idealized image of the new Soviet man.
 
Constructing the Narrative
16 Testimonials from believers of multiple Protestant religions, and across decades of Soviet
history, follow a remarkably uniform narrative arc and draw from a set phraseology.
Most commonly, believers describe their lives as a journey from religion and toward the
truth found only in communism.32 They begin with an explanation of how they could have
been convinced to join a sect in the first place. The most common factors were ignorance,
poor education,  personal hardship,  and trickery on the part of preachers and clergy.
Those believers living in western borderland territories annexed during World War II
could describe growing up in extreme poverty without blaming the Soviet state, instead
faulting conditions under Polish and Romanian rule, and under German occupation. Some
of these individuals joined religious organizations prior to the arrival of Soviet power.
Nikolai, a former Baptist, recounted how he had grown up in a poor peasant family in
interwar Romania, working as a shepherd already at the age of six to help support his
family. His parents died early in his childhood, leaving him at the mercy of relatives until
he eventually found himself homeless and doing odd jobs to survive on the streets. When
local evangelicals approached him with words of comfort, he found solace in religion and
quickly joined the congregation.33
17 Personal trauma, frequently tied to experiences during World War II, created a sense of
uncertainty and a  longing for  solutions to seemingly insoluble  problems.  By pinning
religious conversion so heavily to wartime experiences, the state also depicted religiosity
as born out of a specific historical context and therefore unlikely to repeat itself under
normal, peacetime conditions. This narrative strategy downplayed the threat of religion
and also placed its origins firmly in the past. However, as years passed, more narratives
cited trauma unrelated to the war, including physical impairments, chronic disease, and
family problems as explanations for conversion. Where modern medicine had failed to
offer a cure, religious leaders stepped in with promises of miracles. One woman joined the
Baptists after prayer seemed to aid her recovery from a dangerous operation.34 Many
accounts  cite  multiple  traumatic  incidents,  which  not  only  helped  account  for  the
person’s conversion to religion, but also made them particularly sympathetic to readers.
One woman,  for  instance,  detailed how eight  of  her  siblings  died in  childhood from
famine  or  sickness,  her  mother  turned  to  alcoholism,  her  father  killed  himself,  her
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husband died young,  and one of  her  daughters  was  electrocuted to  death.  She  then
related how religious leaders had preyed on her during her time of grief.35
18 Former believers also pointed to their lack of education as a reason for their religious
conversion. Elderly believers or those who grew up in the western borderlands outside of
Soviet rule blamed the legacy of tsarist or bourgeois educational institutions for their low
levels of schooling.36 As time wore on, this justification no longer worked well, as many, if
not most, Soviet believers had attended Soviet schools in their youth. At the same time, a
large portion of young believers had grown up in religious households. These individuals
tended instead to shift responsibility onto their parents, who they claimed had essentially
brainwashed them as children, using fear of eternal punishment to inculcate religious
belief.37 One young former believer, raised as a Baptist, recalls how his Sunday school
teacher turned him and the other children against their secular teachers, teaching them
to view themselves as “fighters for the truth” in their classrooms.38
19 Having  converted,  former  believers  now  had  the  arguably  more  difficult  task  of
explaining why they stayed, many of them for several decades. In general, they described
their time in the organization as a slow journey from darkness to light, from ignorance to
understanding, and from scorn for Soviet society to a desire to rejoin it. These motifs
appear in nearly every story. A sampling of titles illustrates the ubiquity of such images:
“I saw the light,” “From darkness to life,” “Toward the light,” “Four Years in Darkness,”
and “Escape from darkness.”39 Testimonials frequently referred to the years spent as
members  of  religious  organizations  as  being  like  a  “dream”  (or  more  frequently,  a
“nightmare”)  and  religion  itself  as  being  akin  to  a  “narcotic.”40 They  lived  with  a
“blindfold” over their eyes, incapable of seeing reality or recognizing their misguided
beliefs.41 Religion had captured their minds and enslaved them through fear and forced
obedience. These bonds had to be broken so that believers could liberate themselves.42
One man entitled his story, “I became a free person again.”43
20 More concretely, members cited the same reasons for remaining believers as they had for
joining religion in the first place. Lack of education made it more difficult for members to
realize the falsity and hypocrisy of the religion’s teachings. It justified why otherwise
loyal  Soviet  citizens,  having found themselves  in antisocial  organizations,  often took
several years,  even decades,  to leave.  Believers also highlighted how religion isolated
them from the surrounding community. Almost all stories noted how, during the time
when the authors belonged to a religion, they did not read newspapers, watch TV, or
listen to the radio. Religious leaders told them that the outside world was evil and must
be avoided, instilling fear of eternal damnation for failure to adhere to these strict rules.
Former believers recalled how the threat of eternal damnation paralyzed them, making
them unwilling to listen to reason.44
21 Eventually, of course, former believers chronicled how they came to renounce their faith.
They  recalled  a  hunger  for  the  truth  that  led  them to  reexamine  their  beliefs  and
question their membership in religious organizations. Having begun this soul-searching
process, members found themselves disillusioned by the unethical and sometimes
criminal  activities  of  their  religious  leaders.  Former  members  of  congregations  not
registered with the state also stressed their religion’s dangerous anti-Soviet ideology and
political agenda.45 A few stories came from believers who renounced religion during or
after  serving time for  illegal  religious  activity  or  for  conscientious  objection.46 Many
believers told readers how they uncovered contradictions in the Bible or in the religion’s
interpretation of the Scriptures, or both.47 In some cases, they formed friendships with
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non-believers and desired more involvement in their work collectives or communities
outside of the religion.48 Sometimes atheist agitators won over their trust and slowly
convinced them of the falsity of their beliefs.49
22 Narratives of former believers required happy endings as proof that their authors had
made the right choice. In most versions, the individual eagerly reentered society, finding
fulfillment both in labor and in the broader task of building communism. This had added
importance in the Khrushchev era, with the increased demand that all citizens engage in
“socially useful labor.” Indeed, many believers, primarily clergy, were exiled under a 1961
decree  against  “parasitism.”50 Testimonials  depicted  believers  as  scorning  work  and
society in favor of preparing for the afterlife.51 One man recalled how local Pentecostal
leaders spread rumors that the world was about to end, and encouraged members not to
bother with secular concerns like work meetings,  elections,  and military service.52 As
believers transformed back into Soviet citizens, their hostility to labor morphed into love
of work. A Witness who had considered work pointless in the face of Armageddon now
had his portrait on the honor board at his job.53 Another former believer borrowed the
Stalinist slogan “life has become brighter, easier, more joyful” to express his sentiments.54
23 In reality, believers often faced serious discrimination in the workplace, making their job
choices limited. Also, while narratives portrayed believers as lacking a strong work ethic,
many agitators privately acknowledged the opposite.  At a 1963 Komsomol plenum in
Moldavia, for example, one attendee noted his own difficulties in working with Baptists at
the  factories,  as  they  did  not  smoke,  did  not  drink,  and  were  good  workers.  He
complained that the Komsomol lacked compelling examples from within their ranks to
counteract this upstanding image of young Baptists.55 In this sense, testimonials served a
useful purpose in undermining the positive reputation of Protestants as hard workers.
24 In short, the conclusion of such narratives was meant to convince current believers that
they too could leave religion and begin new, better lives as productive citizens. Almost all
began or ended their stories with a message to current members to follow their example.
56 One former Baptist proclaimed his wishes for those still trapped in religious belief:
I would like them [believers] to free themselves from this religious fog, from falsity
and lies, to see the world as it really is, without any interference from non-existent
“supernatural”  forces.  I  want  them  to  see  how  Soviet  people  are  transforming
nature,  building  hydroelectric  stations,  farming  the  virgin  lands,  how  they  are
selflessly working to build a bright, perfect life for everyone, for all peoples.57
25 Former believers contrasted this idyllic picture of life without religion with their own
experiences in religion, which they depicted as utterly devoid of happiness and joy. For
one woman, life as a Baptist had been “monotone,” but once she discovered atheism, it
seemed to her that the birds began to sing more beautifully, the flowers appeared more
brightly colored, and she realized she had never been so happy in her entire life.58 When
the  magazine  Nauka  i  religiia received  an  anonymous  letter  in  1962  criticizing  the
publication for attacking religion, which the author argued brought comfort and internal
satisfaction  to  believers,  the  editors  responded  by  citing  multiple  former  believer
narratives depicting how miserable life had been for them.59 Indeed, expressions of regret
and words of warning completed the standard narrative of former believers.
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Heaven will be built on Earth!
26 The  Soviet  state  published  former  believer  testimonials  not  only  with  believers  and
atheist  agitators  in  mind.  In  fact,  most  people  reading  these  stories  in  the  local
newspapers belonged to neither category.  The state intended these stories to have a
prophylactic  effect  on  this  wider  audience  by  teaching  citizens  the  dangers  of
involvement  with  religious  organizations.  This  had particular  relevance  in  regard to
Protestant religions, whose adherents actively proselytized in the Soviet Union to convert
new members, and with some success. Atheist narratives offered a potential rebuttal to
such  efforts.  Together  with  intensified  atheist  agitation  and  individual  work  with
believers, these strategies meant to beat Protestant religions at their own game.
27 Atheist  agitators  hoped that  such stories  would help to  convince believers  and non-
believers alike that the search for purpose in life could be solved with the discovery of
atheism and communism. Yet some accounts suggest the conversion to militant atheism
did  not  always  end individuals’  existential  questions.  To  begin  with,  many former
believers  joined  and  left  several  religious  organizations  prior  to  renouncing  faith
altogether.  Their  life  history  could  not  be  simply  divided into  two halves.  One  man
recounted  having  joined  the  Baptists,  Pentecostals,  and  the  Seventh-Day  Adventists
before abandoning religion.60 Another man had been an Old Believer, Baptist, Pentecostal,
and Witness.61 In other words, many believers had spent time as non-believers, but found
life without religious faith somehow unsatisfying.
28 As  a  result,  some  former  believers  admitted  to  having  previously  left  religious
organizations,  only  to  return to  them later.  Many of  them noted how after  publicly
denouncing Protestantism, they continued to receive visits from their former religious
leaders  asking  them  to  reconsider.  Indeed,  atheist  propaganda  sometimes  included
complaints that once a believer had been convinced to leave his faith, atheist agitators
lost interest in him, viewing the case as resolved. Religious preachers, on the other hand,
were  often  much  more  persistent  in winning  back  lost  sheep  and  did  successfully
convince some to return to the organization. In one incident, a young Pentecostal man
left the religion in 1971, but returned years later, wanting to reunite with his family and
regain his former life. While he was an atheist, his old congregation still helped him build
a new home, whereas the local Communist Party youth organization (Komsomol) had
been less forthcoming with such assistance. The story concludes by arguing that if Soviet
collectives paid more attention to people in need and followed through with former
believers, this man’s return to religion would never have happened.62
29 Narratives of former believers who had slipped back into religion served as a warning to
atheist agitators to appreciate the need for patient, thorough, time-intensive individual
work with believers. Many stories dwell on moments where schools and work collectives
failed to reach out to believers,  or even mocked them for their religious beliefs.  Had
someone from the community intervened to help them, the former believers suggested,
they might have left religion much sooner, or never joined in the first place. Overall,
atheist agitation often failed to compete with religious proselytism. One atheist agitator
gave an example to illustrate the problem. In the past eight years, activists had held four
conversations with a local believer, Semen. During that same time, Semen had spent at
least eighty hours a month engaged in religious services and activities.63 Atheism simply
could not hope to win out with this imbalance of energy and resources.
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30 Former  believers  also  co-opted  religious  proselytism  in  the  tone  and  style  of  their
testimonials, which often resembled religious language more typically found in stories of
conversion to, and not from religion. Believers “confessed” their religious past to a Soviet
society with unlimited ability to forgive its repentant citizens.64 They described their
journeys  as  searches  for  “the  truth,”  for  a  higher  meaning  or  purpose,  which  they
ultimately found in the construction of communism. They maintained that evil does exist
in this world and must be defeated, but that it comes out of economic injustice and not
from Satan or original sin. One former believer declared that human existence is a “battle
of truth against falsity, and the powers of good against the powers of evil.”65 The stories
described  how  believers  began  to  doubt  the  teachings  of  the  Bible  and  turned  to
antireligious literature for answers. One man related how, after praying to God for help
but hearing no response, he read the popular atheist work, The Bible for Believers and Non-
Believers, followed by the works of Marx, Lenin, and Herzen, and got the information he
needed.66 The realization of religion’s falsity and communism’s truth often came as an
“epiphany” that could not be ignored or disputed.67 Just as joining religion had required a
definitive break with the sinful secular world, accepting communism meant a permanent
and public rejection of their former religious community.
31 Narratives depicted communist society as a superior earthly paradise to that promised by
Christianity, and one in which admission would be based on hard work, not on faith and
prayer. Former believers promised that communism would build this perfect world on
earth.68 This vow echoed Khrushchev’s statements that communism would be achieved in
the immediate future. One former Adventist proclaimed that “our ‘eternal kingdom’ is
not in heaven” and the “name of that kingdom is communism.” Only active builders of
communism would gain entrance, he noted.69 A former Baptist told readers that “paradise
needs to be built on earth. Don’t wait for it in the afterlife. It’s not going to happen.”70 Life
without  this  secular  goal  had  no  meaning,  and  so  believers  described  their  time  in
religious organizations as utterly wasted and empty.71 Through atheism, they were “born
again”  as  Soviet  citizens.72 The  stories  further  echoed  the  millennial  urgency  of
conversion, but without the references to Armageddon. One former Witness encouraged
other believers: “Do not lose time — join the ranks of builders of communism!”73
32 While all the narratives share common themes and are written in a similar style, some
differences  do  emerge  between  the  various  Protestant  denominations.  Former
Pentecostals more frequently discussed the damage to mental and physical health caused
by  speaking  in  tongues,  faith  healings,  and  other  rituals,  which  they  described  as
frightening.74 Former Baptists dwelled most heavily on the baptism ritual itself, which
was often depicted as a serious health risk. In some instances, believers died or became
gravely ill as a result of baptisms in cold water.75 For Witnesses, the situation was a bit
different, as the Soviet state had banned the group from registering with the government
as  a  religion.  Their  stories  almost  always  included  allegations  of  the  organization’s
involvement  in  anti-Soviet  activities  and  its  anti-Soviet  political  ideology.76 Witness
narratives also included a disproportionate number of believers who had served prison
sentences for their religious activity.77
33 These differences helped to create a threat hierarchy, in which Witnesses represented the
greatest potential harm for society, and (registered) Baptists the least, a distinction that
mirrored and reinforced the actual state policy toward these religions. One man, who had
been a member of the Baptists, Pentecostals, and Witnesses, wrote in his memoir that the
Witnesses were “the most reactionary, base, and despicable” of the three.78 A survey of
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Moldavian press coverage also suggests that newspapers published a disproportionate
number of stories on the religions in its locality that it felt were most dangerous. As a
result, Moldavian district papers abounded with tales of former Witnesses, despite their
relatively small membership.79 At the same time, the new religious policy, which dictated
attention  to  local  conditions,  meant  that  testimonials  did  tend  to  reflect  the  actual
religious diversity of the surrounding community. Thus, while Moldavian and western
Ukrainian  papers,  printed  in  areas  with  high  concentrations  of  Witnesses,  included
hundreds of stories from this religious community, citizens in central Russia may have
never heard of the Witnesses at all.
 
Taking Sides, Dividing Communities
34 In line with state religious policy,  every narrative proclaimed the loyalty of ordinary
believers to the Soviet state.80 At the same time, these stories also demonized leaders and
so-called  “fanatics,”  who  held  the  blame  for  recruiting  honest  Soviet  citizens  into
religion. The image of a spider web enjoyed popularity as a means of illustrating how
cunning,  predatory  leaders  trapped  unwitting  individuals.81 Leaders’  criminal  or
hypocritical  actions  provided  a  key  reason  for  why  believers  ultimately  rejected
Protestantism. Ultimately,  if  former believers wanted to frame themselves as victims,
they  needed perpetrators  and found them in  their  preachers,  ministers,  and church
elders. They portrayed these individuals as extortionists, former Nazis or collaborators,
thieves, hooligans, rapists, child abusers, adulterers, wreckers, speculators, drunkards,
deserters from the Soviet Army, and deadbeats.82
35 If individual believers portrayed their own lives and actions as being in line with Soviet
norms,  albeit  with more personal  trauma and less  education,  they displayed a much
different attitude toward their former religious leaders. Here, the testimonials frequently
resorted to gross sensationalism, contrasting their own innocence with their leaders’
extreme guilt. One Adventist claimed he almost went blind because his religion forced
him to avoid daylight at all costs. Having left the religion, he burned his Bible and put up
white curtains in his home.83 A former Witness denounced his own, now deceased wife,
whom he recalled put glass and ashes in the neighbors’ bread dough when they refused to
join the religion.84 Another former member recalled how one L’vov leader had raped a
fourteen-year-old  girl,  an  accusation that  appeared in  multiple  sources.85 In  general,
stories from former Witnesses tended to have the greatest quantity and most extreme
examples of misconduct, further enforcing the view that this religion posed the greatest
risk to Soviet society among Protestant organizations.
36 The state needed this grisly portrait of rampant amorality to overcome a major hurdle to
eliminating Protestant religious communities. These religions’ claims of a higher moral
code  were  one  of  their  major  attractions  for  members.  They  generally  preached
abstention  from  alcohol  consumption,  tobacco  use,  and  sexual  activity  outside  of
marriage.  Many former believers admitted that the religion’s proclaimed high ethical
standards had been a major factor in their decision to join. By tarnishing the images of
their former pastors and ministers, they exposed religion’s moral superiority as a myth.86
Most frequently, the narratives include tales of how religious leaders misappropriated
donations for their own personal benefit.87 At the same time, former believer testimonials
demonstrated that desirable moral qualities could be found outside of faith communities.
One woman noted that she joined the Baptists in large part because of  the refuge it
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provided from her alcoholic husband, who was not a member of the faith. She expressed
gratitude that atheist agitators not only convinced her to abandon her faith, but also
managed to transform her husband into an upstanding, sober citizen.88 One Pentecostal
woman recounted how after her husband died in an apartment fire, her work collective
immediately provided financial aid and also helped her son attend a summer camp. She
credited their kindness as saving her from “religious imprisonment.”89
37 Many former believers described Christian ethics as inherently amoral and inferior to
Communist ethics.  They pointed out that the vaunted principle of unconditional love
meant that Christians loved Nazis and saw them as brothers and equals.90 Good deeds
were portrayed as self-interested actions meant to convince individuals to join the faith.
One woman, acknowledging how the Adventists financially supported her after she was
fired  from her  job,  chalked  up  their  actions  to  “selfish”  motives.  This  same  person
claimed that the concept of forgiveness for sins was tantamount to an endorsement of
murder and violence.91 A former Baptist questioned how his faith could require him to
love those American capitalists who were plotting to drop a nuclear bomb on the USSR.92
38 While that the Soviet state extended legal registration to many religious organizations, it
faced increasing scrutiny starting in the Brezhnev era from foreign observers for its
persecution  of  religious  believers.  The  Soviet  press  acknowledged  complaints  from
abroad while attempting to justify the need to prosecute certain fanatical and dangerous
believers. Official rhetoric maintained that the state prosecuted these individuals not for
their  religious  convictions,  but  for  their  illegal,  subversive  political  actions.93 For
example,  the introduction to a 1980 collection of former believer stories justified the
recent trial of several Pentecostals as a criminal matter involving illegal activity and in no
way connected to the freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the constitution and laws
of the USSR. The authors denounced western media coverage as falsely labeling such
incidents as examples of religious persecution. It also reassured the reader that most
believers are not criminals, but rather sincere and honest people, trapped in a religious
“prison.”94
39 The demonization of religious leaders provided proof that strong measures were needed
to  protect  state  and  society  from such  vicious  predators,  and  helped  keep  the  vast
majority of Soviet citizens from considering membership in a religious organization. In
this, the testimonials aided the goals of the Soviet state. Yet they also undermined efforts
to encourage understanding and patience when dealing with sects,  particularly when
combined  with  other  negative  press  coverage  of  Protestant  religions.  Readers  were
expected to believe that a reasonable citizen could have joined an antisocial, if not anti-
Soviet,  organization full  of  seedy characters,  and not  realized this  for  several  years.
Furthermore, if press reports continued to contend that the vast majority of believers fell
into the “loyal  citizen” category,  former believer  narratives  painted a very different
picture, with both leaders and rank-and-file members engaging in unethical or criminal
activities.  Overall,  the  distinction between ordinary believers  and fanatics  or  leaders
remained murky at best in these accounts. In some instances, the only difference between
a fanatic and an ordinary member was that the former still belonged to the religion while
the latter no longer did. Thus, in encountering their religious neighbors, Soviet citizens
may have found it  difficult to determine who was “loyal” and who was the “enemy”
among them.
40 Believers themselves found that testimonials created divisions within their families and
religious communities.  In almost all  cases,  former believers had family members who
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were also involved in the religion. Repudiating religion required renouncing one’s own
parents,  wives,  husbands,  friends,  and even children.  In short,  by pushing for public
denunciations of religion, the state ensured the frequent destruction of families. Many
youth who grew up in religious organizations only to later reject them told how their
parents had kicked them out of their homes and abandoned them to their fate. Some
school-age children moved into boarding schools after their antireligious stance made it
impossible for them to continue living at home with their families.95 Not surprisingly,
many believers hesitated to publicly renounce the organization,  keeping their loss of
faith secret from friends and family. For the Soviet state, this “double life” was not a
viable option as it did not further the goals of antireligious agitation, and also made it
easier for the former believer to reconsider their decision and return to the faith. Many
former believers recount the internal struggle they waged over whether to come forward
and tell their community and family about their rejection of religion.96
41 When family conflicts did occur after a public renunciation, former believers generally
blamed the religious community for  their  estrangement,  but  they could also express
bitterness at how their own child, spouse, or parents had chosen faith over family. They
recounted how religious leaders taught members to treat former believers as traitors and
to cease all contact with them.97 Some noted that their actions had put a serious strain on
their marriage, claiming that believers were inciting their spouses against them.98 One
1983 work quoted a young former Baptist  who said openly that leaving Baptism was
tantamount to leaving behind one’s family, and that such a step was extremely difficult.
His parents had refused to come to his wedding or to cover the costs unless he returned
to  the  religion.  He  was  instead  married  with  assistance  from the  local  Komsomol.99
Former believers often called on their religious family members by name, exhorting them
to come to their senses and join them in Soviet society.100 One young woman, living apart
from her parents and siblings after leaving the Baptists, ended her story by expressing
the wish that they will break with religion so that they can all be a happy family again.101
Another young man included a plea to his mother, telling her that his door is always open
should she decide to renounce her faith as he had done.102
42 To  counterbalance  the  family  problems  that  resulted  from  leaving  religious
organizations,  testimonials  often  dwell  on  how  religion  itself  created  dysfunctional
families. One former Pentecostal recalled how religious leaders made her break off an
engagement with a Red Army soldier and also cease contact with her brother, who had
helped to raise her.103 Many young people described how their parents forced them to
participate in religion and beat them for the slightest disobedience.104 The Soviet state
hoped that believers reading these stories would recognize how much better life could be
without religion, so much so that it would be worth sacrificing friends and family to have
a chance at this new, superior existence. The success of such an approach seems doubtful.
More likely, the stories kept believers from rejecting religion out of fear of losing their
loved ones. Articles in which religious leaders or members threatened former believers
only added to this problem. Some included accounts of physical violence against those
who left the religion.  In  one instance recounted in  several  sources,  a  man allegedly
murdered his wife and mother-in-law after they left the Witnesses, burning them alive in
their home. For those struggling with doubts about their faith, such an anecdote could
hardly have bolstered their courage to publicly announce their rejection of religion.105
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Conclusion
43 Stalin’s  death  ushered  in  a  new  era  in  Soviet  religious  policy  that  mixed  criminal
prosecution with an increased emphasis on agitation and propaganda targeted at rank-
and-file  believers.  While  state  policy  toward  religion  continued  to  evolve  from
Khrushchev to Gorbachev, former believer testimonials represent an enduring element of
antireligious  work  in  the  late  Soviet  era.  Overall,  although  the  post-Stalin  press
proclaimed that  more  and more  Soviet  citizens  were  leaving  “sects”  each year,  this
official rhetoric remained profoundly static.106 The testimonials presented the state with
a rather serious dilemma. On the one hand, it was hoped that they would make the public
less susceptible to religious proselytism. On the other hand, ongoing media attention
betrayed the staunch resilience of  religious  communities,  thereby demonstrating the
staying power of religion in Soviet society. Thus, the press awkwardly oscillated between
highlighting the threat of these religions and proclaiming their gradual and inevitable
dissolution. The continued discussion revealed the state’s failure to eliminate religious
belief, while providing marginal religious organizations with free publicity.
44 The existence of  communities  of  religious believers who either saw no contradiction
between their faith and Soviet ideology, or who refused to integrate into Soviet society
belied claims that the Soviet Union had attained advanced socialism. Official discourse
attempted  to  resolve  this  problem  by  explaining  away  religious  beliefs  as  mere
“survivals”  from  the  capitalist  past  that  would  completely  disappear  with  the
achievement of communism.107 It portrayed believers as loyal Soviet citizens who had
been misled by manipulative fanatics. Equally critical, it shielded the state from having to
confront the more dangerous possibility that many of its citizens rejected the official
ideology and actually found Protestant religious values and beliefs more appealing than
socialism or communism.
45 Did former  believer  narratives  achieve  their  goals  of  encouraging  other  believers  to
abandon religion, of making it less likely for others to join, and of convincing the larger
populace that most believers were decent Soviet citizens who had just lost their way? The
results were mixed for the first goal. In some cases, former believers claimed that other
peoples’ stories inspired them to also reject religion.108 Still, the fact that many stories
included plaintive calls to friends and family to break with religion demonstrated that
not  all  believers  found  these  stories  convincing.  The  sensationalist  nature  of  many
narratives and authors’  tendency to oversimplify or distort beliefs and practices may
have made it easier for believers to reject entire stories out of hand.109 As a whole, former
believers lacked credibility in their communities, having chosen to side with the state so
publicly in what was typically seen as an act of betrayal and apostasy.110
46 The state also seemed to have met with mixed results regarding its secular readership,
whom it hoped would learn not to get involved with religion, but would help believers in
their  communities.  Undoubtedly,  sensationalist  press  accounts  of  the  evils  of
Protestantism,  including those  by former believers,  scared most  Soviet  citizens  from
associating  with  these  organizations.  The  success  of  this  effort, however,  doomed
attempts to convince citizens to trust or accept believers as loyal, honest neighbors. Thus,
while former believers claimed to have found acceptance in society, until the moment
when they left religion, for the public, they remained under suspicion and derision. The
narratives  themselves  include  references  to  the  mockery  or  cold  indifference  of
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coworkers, classmates, and neighbors, and laments that no one had reached out a helping
hand.111 Some  recount  having  been  illegally  fired  from their  jobs  for  their  religious
beliefs, even while still asserting the freedom of conscience for all believers in the USSR.
112
47 Overall, the state succeeded in confining participation in religious communities to a small
segment  of  the  population  without  the  level  of  violence,  imprisonment,  and  exile
employed against believers under Stalin. At the same time, the state’s end goal had never
been containment of religion, but rather its total liquidation as a prerequisite for the
achievement of communism. Despite decades of agitation and propaganda work, religion
showed no sign of disappearing. It instead became one more hallmark of the failure of
progress toward the “heaven on earth” of communism, and another indication of the
stagnation of the late Soviet era.
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RÉSUMÉS
Résumé
Cet  article  étudie  les  récits  d’anciens  croyants  publiés  depuis  les  années  Hruščëv  jusqu’à  la
période de Gorbačëv.  Il  s’intéresse en particulier aux anciens protestants,  que la propagande
athéiste de l’époque a traités de façon disproportionnée. L’article déconstruit ces narrations dans
lesquelles  les  anciens  croyants  décrivent  leur  passage  de  la  religion  à  l’athéisme  et  au
communisme.  Ces  récits  sont  davantage  considérés  comme  l’un  des  aspects  d’une  tradition
soviétique  plus  large  selon  laquelle  la  construction  de  l’identité  et  la  trajectoire  de  vie
personnelle vont de pair avec l’image idéalisée du nouvel homme soviétique. Ils sont également
le reflet d’une insistance renouvelée, de la part du pouvoir poststalinien, sur la nécessité de créer
une société sans dieu, libérée de tout vestige de croyance religieuse. Pour l’État soviétique, les
rapports publiés de ces anciens croyants prouvaient que la société évoluait véritablement dans
cette direction et, par là même, constituaient une incitation, pour les autres croyants, à suivre
ces  exemples  et  à  embrasser  l’athéisme.  Enfin,  cet  article  évalue  dans  quelle  mesure  ces
témoignages ont réussi, ou échoué, dans leur mission d’éradication de la foi.
Abstract
This article examines former believer narratives from the Khrushchëv to the Gorbachëv era. In
particular, it focuses on former Protestants, who received disproportionate coverage in atheist
propaganda during this  period.  The article  deconstructs  the ways  in  which former believers
described their journey from religion to atheism and communism. These narratives are best seen
as  one  aspect  of  a  broader  Soviet  tradition  of  constructing  one’s  identity  and  personal  life
trajectory in line with the idealized image of the new Soviet man. They also reflect a renewed
emphasis in the post-Stalin era on creating a godless society free of any vestiges of religious
belief. For the Soviet state, published accounts by former believers provided proof that society
was indeed moving in this  direction and offered encouragement to other believers to follow
these examples and embrace atheism. Lastly, this article assesses the relative success or failure of
these testimonials in eliminating religious faith.
“I saw the light”: Former Protestant believer testimonials in the Soviet Unio...




Department of History, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
“I saw the light”: Former Protestant believer testimonials in the Soviet Unio...
Cahiers du monde russe, 52/1 | 2011
22
